INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 1983 it was revealed that a number of youths from Milwaukee had gained access to computers in various parts of the country using the capabilities of Teienet, a nationwide digital communications network. The event quickly became the summer media event.
It was reported in virtualiy every newspaper and television news program in the country. Interviews were conducted on national television programs, and Johnny Carson included the incidents in his monolog.
But what really happened? How serious was the problem? Who was doing this, and how good were they? What are the real vulnerabifities, and what can be done about them? In September, October, and November, the Congress he}d hearings to find out. This paper is a report on those hearinga and a description of proposed computer crime legislation that has been introduced in the 98th Congress. In his opening statement on the first day of hearings, Representative Glickman cited the pervasiveness of computers in modern society and the lack of awareness of the ways in which computers can be improperly used. In citing the reasons for' the hearings, he said, "As we shall learn today, there is an entire underground culture of people known as "computer trackers" who continuously try to defeat the security measures programmed into modern computers. Beyond this, computer systems are vulnerable to a variety of intentional and uninterrtiinal actiins that can result in errors, interruption of service, or unauthorized access to and manipulation of confidential information.
THE HE4RINGS
To gain a better understanding of these threats and vulnerabilities, the Subcommittee is today beginning an indepth series of hearings that we hope will not only lead to euch an understanding but also will identify steps that need to be taken to prevent abuse of the rapidly growing technology." Senator Cohen's press release announcing hearings of his subcommittee asserted that sophisticated criminals, rather than hackers, are the real probiem.
'The frequancy of computer crime, which the FBi has named as the fastest growing form of larceny in the United States, is growing much faater than the government'a efforts to thwart the problem. We are not just dealing with clever kide who are having fun with their home computers; we are faced with a sophisticated form of crima and misuse which can cause losses in the billions of dollars each year."
The first day of hearings was a circus. The first two witnesses were Neal Patrick, one of the Milwaukee 414s, and Jim McClary, Division Leader of the Operational Security and Safeguards Division at Los Alamos. As a potential confrontation between victim and attacker it provided a great deal of drama, and it was truly a media event. Approximately 20 television cameras filmed the proceedings, and the clicking of the still cameras was occasionally so loud that the speakers could not be heard. During subsequent hearings the drama subsided enormously and by the end of the Senate hearings the proceedings had become routine. Although the attacka by hackers provided the impetus for the hearings, little time was actually devoted to the problems they can cause.
However, one subject that arose several times was the moral and ethical question of whether the acts of the 414s (and others like them) were wrong (it is fairly clear that these acts are not illegal). Victims are in agreement that this kind of activity is wrong, but others, including some members of congress, are not so sure.
The hearings did publicize the potential security and privacy problems inherent in the use of computers. However, the testimony of the witnesses did not illuminate the threats to and vulnerabiiities of computer systems very well, as Representative Giicknran had hoped, nor did they support Senator Cohen's statement. The hearings showed that we do not have unaccepted notioncrf what computer crime is. Thus, wedo not have aciear idea of how much computer crime there IS.
The discussion that follows will select a few of the major themes from the hearings rather than trying to report everything in chronological order.
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PR08LEM

Definitions
Most of the witnesses did not explicitly say what they meant by computer crime or cornputer-relateti crime. "means an electronic, magnetic, optical, hydraulic, organic, or other high-speed data processing device or system performing iogicai arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any property, data storage facility, or communication facility directiy reiated to or operating in conjunction with such device or system; but does not inciude an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portabie hand-heid caicuiator, or any computer designed and manufactured for, and which is used exclusively for routine personai, famiiy, or househoid purposes and which is not used to access, to communicate with, or to manipulate any other computer."
How
Among other anomalies, this definition ieaves us with the odd situation of an electronic device that heretofore has been used exclusively for games and the family budget (and is, therefore, not a computer), which is now used to commit a crime. Suppose, for example, i caicuiate tabias and print saies literature showing how much money you wiii make by investing in my phony land saies scheme.
1 have not attempted a computer crime because the device i used is (or was) not a computer. We wili encounter worse probiems if we sfiow the device to be magicaliy transformed into a computer the moment it is used in a crime.
The description of the acts covered in H.R.1 092 did not appear to be circular, but once we inciude the definition of a computer, we aee that it is. We are back in the situation of determining that some event was a computer crime after we already knew that it was a crime for some other reason.
More important is the question of whether we want events iike the one in the iand saies exampie to be computer crimes. i think not. it was simply a fraud in which the computer was invoived in a non-essential wav. it is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a compiete new definition of computer crime. However, i suggest that it shouid cover acts in which the computer is eaaential --acts which couid not have been committed without the use of a computer. And, the perpetrator of the crime shouid be the one who used the computer, not aorneone else.
The definition of the word use aiso causes some problems. in H.R.1092, to use a computer means "to instruct, communicate with, store data in, or retrieve data from, or otherwise utilize the iogical, arithmetic, or memory functions of a computer, or, with fraudulent or malicious intent, to cause another to put faise information into a computer." This makes practiiaiiy every weifare fraud a computer crime. They aii depend on convincing some weifare representative that you are entitied to benefita when you aren't, and the information you provide is aiways entered into a computer. llrese frauds should not be ciassed as computer crimes.
i81
As a final example of the difficulties involved in trying to pin down what is meant by the te$ms computer and computer' crime, 1 include some definitions from the Colorado computer crime biii. Coiorado has simpier definitions which avoid the probiem with the word use but are not much more successful with co,mputer.
"To use means to instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, computer system, or computer network.
Computer means an electronic device which performs iogicai, arithmetic, or memory functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impuisee, and inciudes aii input, output, processing, storage, software, or communication facilities which are connected or related to such a device in a system or network." Ths definition of a computer is at first pieasing because it is so much simpler than the federal definitions, but it inciudes too much. It not Oniy inciudea hand-heid caicuiatora but aiso such innocuous devices as digitai watches, fuei injection systems, bienders, end eievatora. it, too, is too broad e definition. We can now begin to see some of the eiements of a computer crime definition. it shouid include that the computer was used in an essentiai way to commit the act and that it was used~of the act. And, the acts proscribed shouid inoiude the kind of electronic trespassing practiced by the 414s and others iike them.
The definition of a computer must not be so broad that it inciudes calcuiatore, human brains, and electronic devices embedded in other products such as bienders and automobiles. But, it shouid not restrict things so as to aiiow a particular device to wander in and out of computerhood depending on how it was iast used. "There is no poesibiiity that the damage resulting from criminai conduct invoiving computer-based systems wiii ever be abie to even approximate the iosses to mistakea."
How Much Computer Crime is
Who Commits Computer Crime?
There was greater agreement on the sources of computer crime than on the amount of it. Many of the witnesses feit that outsiders, particularly the casuai outsiders who provoked the hearings in the first piace, are not the probiem. The biggest probiem to be faced comes from the peopie authorized to use the system, and the cure is not more technology, it is proper use of ihe contmis that are aiready availabie. For exampie, Wiiiis Ware of the Rand Corporation: "in the commercial sector, the technicai threat is at present minimai. The big threat is people within the systems themselves. ... We need only the corporate wiii to addreas the probiem, and the corporate commitment to put the issue on the same ievei of concern as protecting other vaiuabie resources. By implication, we aiso need the corporate commitment to spend the modest sums needed." 
When Susan Headley waa questioned by Senator
Cohen about the activities of the group she participated in, she stated that they had access to credit information, that they had changed credit ratings, and that they had shut down portions of the telephone system. Asked whether she ever thought any of this might be illegal, she responded that the group wasn't after material gain and that the question had never been raised.
Geoffrey
Goodfeilow, a "reformed" hacker now employeed at SRi international, exhibits the same basic feelings in his testimony. While he states the he depiores the unsanctioned entry and "rummaging" of computer systems, he also places most of the responsibility on the operators of computer systems. For example, "...computer site administrators are not taking reasonable and prudent measures to protect their computer systems from even the most casual methods of circumvention. ... The way 1 view *reasonable and prudent' measures of protection from the casual penetration is by drawing a paradigm with the way DoD classified information is handled.
With respect to the handling and use of classified information, it is the responsibility of the organization to which you belong, in conformance with DoD guidelines, to provide you with rules and regulations in the handling of information. It is also the responsibility of your organization to provide you with a safe place (i.e. a vault) to store said information and to provide adequate safeguards (such as alarm systems, security personnel and patrols) to prevent unauthorized access.
The same methodology should be taken to heart by administrators of computer systems.
It's their responsibility to provide reasonable and prudent measures to prevent unauthorized access attempts from gaining access to the system."
Mr. Goodfellow went on to note that system users also have a responsibility to protect sensitive information. He then stated his belief that we should train our children that enter-. ing someone's computer system unbidden is as bad as entering someone's house. The point is that today this is not seen as unethical. The other interesting point that emerged from the hearings concerns nralicioua intent. The federal statute most widely used in the computer crime area is interstate fraud by wire. In order to successfully prosecute a case using this law, the prosecutor must show an intent to defraud. This requirement is also present in most of the proposed legislation. The hackers, in explaining what they do, universally claim that they have no malicious intent. They simply want to learn, to find out what computers are out there and how to get into them. In many cases, particularly through Telenet access, they don't even know whose computer they have accessed. R will not be easy to convince a jury that someone who doesn't know whose computer he is using set out with an fntent to injure the owner of the computer. 
Young
Proposed Remedies
Six bills have been introduced in the
Several witnesses
suggested the formation of a National Commission similar in nature to the Privacy Protection Commission created by the Privacy Act of 1974. While this seems to be a prescription for studying the problem rather than doing anything about it, it may be the best course of action at present. We have not achieved anything like a consensus about or even whether there is a problem, and the proposed legislative remedies all seem to have severe defects. A National Commission might be able to define a problem to be solved and propose some legislation to solve it. Prognosis me first session of the 98th Congress included more acthriiy on computer crime than has previously occurred. However, this does not mean that legislation will result. The Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary in the House of Representatives held hearings on the last day of the session. These hearings covered bills H.R.1 092, H.R.4384, and H.R.4301.
The moat intereating testimony came from Representative Gfickman who chaired the previous three days of hearings In the House. His summary of the previous hearings was that the subject is extremely complex involving questions of privacy and proper management as well as vulnerabilities in systems. He urged caution, saying that the Congress should not attack the problem piecemeal. He stated that Office of Management and Budget leadership is "terribly weak", that we need to take another look at privacy and wiretapping laws, and advocated a national commission to study problems of privacy and system vulnerability.
Mr. Glickman did conclude that there is a real problem to be solved: the abuse of information. However he felt that the current bills merely scratch the surface of the problem by concentrating on the instrumentality of the abuse rather than the abuse Itself.
The witnesses from the executive branch were not particularly supportive of any of the legislation. For example, Mr. Keeney from the Department of Justice said that the government feels some sense of urgency and has a task force at Justice which is studying the problem. They believe that legislation is needed and plan to make a recommendation but they have not yet reached a decision.
The Congress has been considering bills on computer crime since Senator Abraham Ribicoff introduced his bill, S.1766, in 1977 inthe 95th Congress. Thecurrent H.R.1092 is very similar to Senator Ribicoff's original bill. Nor!e of these bills has received favorable action in committee, and it does not seem likely that the 98th Congress will act on any of the pending legislation. Given the lack of support by the executive branch, and the defects in the Legislative proposals, this may be the right thing to do. In any case, protection is still our responsibility, and we cannot expect any new legal tools soon. 
APPENDIX
